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The perennial subject of debate about who should manage
the operations of a firm and be entitled to the benefits of
these activities will probably be prolonged in the years to
come. This discussion, in view of the most orthodox econo-
mists, is absolutely unjustified. In their opinion, the abun-
dant theoretical literature that vouched for the superiority of
the “capitalist formula,” compared to other types of firms, is
(or should be) enough to wind up the debate. Furthermore, a
mere consideration of the structure of the most advanced
economies seems to uphold the already referred to theoretical
arguments. However, in spite of this overwhelming evidence,
many continue to advocate organizational forms in which other
stakeholders, who are not the shareholders, could play a more
active role. The group that is referred to most often is, un-
doubtedly, that of workers. Although there are different de-
grees of participation for workers in the company’s affairs, it
is widely known that the democratization of the means of
production is socially and economically desirable. Producer
cooperatives (as these firms are labeled according to Spanish
Cooperative Law 27/1999; or labor-managed firms according
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to the term employed by Bonin, Jones, & Putterman, 1993)
are the maximum expression of corporate democracy, inas-
much as workers own the assets of the firm and control the
decision-making process.
Certainly, the conclusion reached in this debate is of spe-
cial importance because of its implications in terms of eco-
nomic policies. For example, some countries enact laws on
the participation of workers on the board of directors; and
firms that encourage profit sharing or shareholding schemes
are given tax exemptions and other incentives. However, from
our perspective, before putting forward recommendations in
terms of economic policies, we must carry out a clear assess-
ment of the economic impact on the democratization of the
firm.
To this end, in the past decade, some researchers have re-
viewed the vast theoretical and empirical literature available
on this issue (Bonin et al., 1993; Dow, 2001; Dow &
Putterman, 2000; Hansmann, 1996). The assessment this re-
search came up with is not ambiguous: the cooperative firm
has serious disadvantages when compared to the capitalist firm.
However, any reader who is interested in the details of this
decision can ascertain that there is no agreement among co-
operative researchers on what is the real cause of the supposed
inferiority of this type of firm. Furthermore, others argue that
most of the disadvantages attributed to the cooperatives are
more theoretical than factual, and that, in fact, cooperatives
have advantages when compared to capitalist firms.
For these reasons, we shall provide, in this paper, a broad
view of the main explanations provided by the theoretical and
empirical literature, then we shall fill the present vacuum
and propose solutions not envisaged hitherto. In order to de-
velop this objective, we have resorted to new theoretical ar-
guments and new empirical evidence. In theoretical terms,
the literature on cooperatives has been complemented and
extended based on the most recent research on corporate gov-
ernance. Due to the complementary nature of both approaches,
we can carry out research work on the corporate governance of
labor-managed firms by pointing out the conflict of interests
encountered in these firms. We shall also examine the pos-
sible institutions and mechanisms that can work toward miti-
gating this conflict. Empirically, we put forward the case of
“Mondragón Corporación Cooperativa” (MCC). The MCC is
the biggest industrial cooperative movement in the world and
constitutes one of the few examples of successful democratic
industrial organizations. The description of the peculiar sys-
tem of MCC corporate governance will serve as a starting point
for the analysis of possible alternatives. Furthermore, it will
also serve as a more general reflection on corporate gover-
nance. This consideration will bring the paper to a close.
We consider that a better understanding of corporate gov-
ernance problems and the way to approach them from the
MCC perspective can help us to propose appropriate solu-
tions that will take into account the special features of this
peculiar organization. In addition, this approach can help us




Does a Corporate Governance Theory of
Cooperatives Exist?
Cooperatives have been given little attention in the economic
literature on corporate governance due to two main reasons.
The first is that most of the research works postulate that
there is no separation between ownership and corporate con-
trol, and workers, being the residual claimants, should have
the right to make decisions (Hansmann, 1988). The second
reason comes from the traditional framework in which the
concept of corporate governance was formulated. In its most
classical version, exemplified in the work of Shleifer and Vishny
(1997), corporate governance centers the discussion around
large corporations within the advanced economies, where the
agency problem becomes more evident (Jensen & Meckling,
1976).
Presently, the number of researchers who advocate an al-
ternative conceptual framework to address the corporate gov-
ernance problems is increasing. Some of these views state that
(1) the ownership of the firm can be transferred to other stake-
holders that do business with the firm, in addition to those
who provide financial resources (Hansmann, 1996); (2) busi-
ness decisions have consequences far beyond the agency rela-
tionship; and (3) contracts, laws, and “exit options” do not
entirely protect those groups that are involved (Tirole, 2001;
Zingales, 2000). This broad perspective allows us to analyze
the corporate governance of producer cooperatives.
In particular, we assume that the owners of the coopera-
tive, who are the workers, are entitled to heterogeneous pref-
erences (Hansmann, 1996). The multiplicity of objectives of
those who share corporate control will imply important policy
costs when it comes to decision making, for there is a slow-
down in the decision-making process, and the agency prob-
lems bring about mutual distrust. In order to reduce the costs
associated with collective decision, workers delegate the daily
management of the organization to managers. In this way,
the disparities between different legal forms of the firm can
be established in terms of which group or groups shall be
involved in the decision-making process (or have the control
rights) and who shall be entitled to the surplus generated by
the firm (or have rights to the residual income). In a corpora-
tion, or a capital-controlled firm, the board of directors is
appointed by the investors who, in principle, are entitled to
the surplus. Whereas, in a workers’ cooperative, the surplus
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is shared, and the governing council, which is the equivalent
body to the board of directors, is elected by workers (Dow,
2001: 202).
Nevertheless, a common characteristic to consider among
these organizations is the existence of an agency problem. This
makes it possible to complement and extend the literature on
cooperatives (for a review, see Bonin et al., 1993; Dow, 2001;
Dow & Putterman, 2000; Hansmann, 1996) on the basis of
the most recent research works on corporate governance (see
Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Tirole, 2001; Zingales, 2000).
However, cooperatives are characterized by an agency rela-
tionship with some peculiarities: the multiplicity of workers’
interests will be reflected in terms of unspecified objectives
that must be attained by the management of the firm. This
imprecision in the definition of the corporate mission will
give more discretionary power to managers to impose their
own preferences to the detriment of workers’ interests. In this
context, corporate governance should propose mechanisms and
institutions that will make it possible to eliminate or miti-
gate the agency problem, hence, maximizing the collective
wealth so as to maximize welfare. But the multiplicity of ob-
jectives inside the cooperative makes the solution to the gov-
ernance problems (through a system of incentives and corporate
monitoring mechanisms) hard to implement, as has been in-
dicated in recent research papers on corporate governance, such
as that by Tirole (2001).
In spite of these theoretical limitations, the empirical evi-
dence provides some interesting examples of institutions and
entities that, even though lacking a well-defined ownership
structure (for example, multiple owners without the possibil-
ity of merging their assets) or serving multiple objectives,
can achieve and improve on the performance of their capital-
ist rivals. This evidence goes against the theoretical results
that suggest just the opposite. The case we consider in this
paper, the MCC, will allow us to illustrate the possible corpo-
rate governance mechanisms that can contribute to the en-
hancement of the competitive stand of the cooperatives. The
recorded growth throughout 50 years puts the MCC in the
seventh position among the Spanish business groups, with
over 200 companies with a workforce of more than 70,000
people, and more than €10 billion in sales. The MCC is com-
posed of industrial, service, and agricultural cooperatives, a
cooperative bank, and a social welfare cooperative, organized
into three spheres of operations—industrial, financial, and
distribution (see Figure 1). The cooperatives are also sustained
by a supporting superstructure offering training centers (ba-
sic education, language schools, technical schools, manage-
rial studies, a university, and centers for cooperative education)
and research facilities (research and development centers).
For the purposes of our analysis, it will be of interest to
stress that the cooperatives that participate in this consor-
tium have a system of governance quite different from other
cooperatives. This is due to the successive transformations
throughout the existence of the consortium. (Turnbull [1995]
describes the governance mechanisms in force in Mondragón
until the MCC was created in 1991.) At present, the coopera-
tives are characterized by a system of governance that imple-
ments a broad objective that amalgamates the interests of all
the cooperative workers of the consortium. Under the sys-
tem, the formula for sharing generated surplus adds fresh
impetus to support a collective social welfare.
Collective Decision, Delegation of Powers, and
Agency Problem
Firms are characterized by a division of labor into functions
that demand different degrees of specialization and skills on
the part of workers. In principle, compensation schemes are
commensurate with the skills/productivity of workers. Con-
sequently, a significant division of labor involving functions
of different degrees of specialization would give rise to sig-
nificant salary differences within the firm. In the same vein,
the special allocation of ownership rights (corporate control
rights, residual income rights; Ben-Ner & Jones, 1995;
Hansmann, 1996) of a cooperative to workers implies that
when workers’ preferences are heterogeneous, the decision-
making process in which all workers participate turns out to
be inefficient (Hansmann, 1988; 1990; 1996). This could be
attributed to the fact that some workers, or coalitions of work-
ers, will attempt to influence voting results (tactical vote),
thereby bringing about high transaction costs (Benham &
Keefer, 1991; Hansmann, 1988). Another possible explana-
tion is that some agreements achieved by the majority are not
sustainable, in the sense that for every possible corporate policy,
there is an alternative proposal preferred by a larger coalition
(Hansmann, 1996).
In order to reduce the transaction costs of collective deci-
sion making, one of the most common solutions is for work-
ers to delegate corporate control rights to a minority entrusted
with the daily managing of the company. The management
of the firm can be carried out by the same group of workers or
can be undertaken by an outside manager hired from the la-
bor market. In this way, the worker-controlled firm can, in
practice, be similar in terms of hierarchy to a capitalist firm.
Thus, the only difference between the two types of organiza-
tions would be that in a cooperative, the board of directors
would be elected by the workers, whereas in the capital-
controlled firm, it would be elected by shareholders (Dow &
Putterman, 2000: 330).
In any case, just as in the capital-controlled firm, there
would be a separation between ownership and control
(Hansmann, 1988).1 Workers’ delegation of decision-making
rights to managers may favor the latter in adopting a non-
maximizing behavior toward the interests of the workers. We
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are, therefore, faced with an agency problem that can be ex-
amined with the traditional tools of corporate governance.
However, in the cooperatives, this conflict presents certain
peculiarities. In the capital-controlled firms, the aim of gov-
ernance mechanisms is to induce managers to pursue share-
holders’ value-maximizing behavior. On the contrary, in the
cooperatives, workers should first agree on its mission and on
the objectives to be pursued by the firm. In this sense, in a
research work on the plywood cooperatives of the Pacific
Northwest in the United States, Craig and Pencavel (1993)
found that the main variables of the objective function of the
cooperatives are those of compensation, working hours, and
workload. This result contrasts with the basic hypothesis of
the literature on cooperatives that considers the maximiza-
tion of worker surplus as the only argument of the objective
function (Prychitko & Vanek, 1996).
FIGURE 1
The Mondragón Cooperative Corporation
Source: MCC Annual Report (1991).
Note: The number of cooperatives is shown in parentheses.
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Other problems related to the definition of the objectives
have been extensively studied from a different perspective by
the theoretical literature (Dow & Putterman, 2000). This lit-
erature has analyzed the conflict of interests among workers
when they decide their contribution (e.g., in terms of effort)
to the cooperatives or the investment that they will make
individually (e.g., specific investments in training) or collec-
tively with the financial help of the firm (e.g., investment
decisions in collective physical assets). The conclusion drawn
from this literature is that, in spite of the fact that all workers
agree ex ante on the objectives (in terms of effort and invest-
ments), the allocation of control rights to this group implies
that they will take ex post decisions that are second-best so-
lutions. This will have a direct impact on the ultimate effi-
ciency of the cooperative and, consequently, on the welfare of
other workers.2 Furthermore, if the skills or productivity of
the workers are different and the most qualified workers do
not have “exit options” (Hirschman, 1970), a transfer of wealth
from the most productive to the least productive workers takes
place within the cooperative. This transfer has an ex ante ef-
fect on the level of specific investments and the effort exerted
by the most productive ones (Kremer, 1997).3 Moreover, this
will probably contribute to the persistence of heterogeneity
and the conflict of interests within the cooperative. All these
arguments lead to the following observation:
Observation 1 (Imprecise mission of the firm): When the
cooperative needs to elect the board of directors, workers have
difficulties in providing their representatives with a coherent
plan of action in order to achieve the objectives pursued by the
firm (Dow & Putterman, 2000: 331). Furthermore, the
mission will be more imprecise as the interests of workers become
more heterogeneous (Hansmann, 1988; 1990; 1996).
In fact, the multiplicity and the conflict of interests among
workers are reflected in a lack of a defined objective to be
attained by the firm. This situation deprives managers of any
plan of action, makes it difficult to make decisions, politi-
cizes the firm, and, in short, increases the power of managers
to impose their own preferences, thus aggravating the con-
flict of interests among workers, and, ultimately, lowering
the firm’s efficiency (Hansmann, 1996).
Observation 2 (Extended agency problem): Cooperatives are
faced with a more complex problem of corporate governance
because it is a question not only of making sure that managers
fulfill the objectives of the firm but of how to define a mission
that maximizes efficiency.
With this observation, we want to highlight that agency
problem is endemic to the cooperative because managers do
not know a priori the objective(s) they have to attend to. In
other words, through the voting mechanism, workers have to
come to an agreement on the objective that the firm needs to
pursue. It is only after members of the cooperative have came
to an agreement that the mechanisms of corporate governance
could be put in place to help resolve conflict among owners
(workers) and managers. Therefore, the mission to be pur-
sued and the mechanisms that must guarantee that managers
take interest in pursing it depend on the outcome of the vot-
ing policy. At any rate, it is not possible to infer a priori what
the result will be.
Transaction costs of collective bargaining and the possibil-
ity that managers make decisions that do not maximize effi-
ciency will probably have a negative impact on the current
value of the cooperative’s investments. For this reason, it is
difficult to carry out new projects financed by outside inves-
tors when the firm will not be able to meet its obligations for
lack of sufficient income (Tirole, 2001: 29). This problem is
aggravated by the fact that employees are risk averse, and
they have limited wealth (Dow & Putterman, 2000).4
The Problem of Corporate Governance in the
Cooperatives and Its Resolution
Before identifying the institutions that can solve or mitigate
conflicts of interests among employees (in the process of de-
fining the mission) or conflicts among employees and man-
agers (in the phase of achievement of the mission), it is
imperative to point out the characteristics of the property
rights of cooperatives. According to the terminology coined
by Fama and Jensen (1983), cooperatives belong to the do-
main of “closed corporations.” Therefore, their decision rights
are restricted—that is, they are not freely transferable and
they do not confer on the owners’ indefinite rights to the cash
flows (in particular, these rights cease to be valid in the cases
of retirement or termination). The restrictive nature of the
rights implies that there cannot be a complete separation be-
tween the functions of risk assumption and decision making,
at least not to the extent that such separation between owner-
ship and corporate governance occurs in firms that belong to
the domain of “open corporations.” Consequently, coopera-
tives cannot attain high levels of risk diversification, more so
if we take into account that employees put all their human
capital and most of their financial capital in the same firm.
Furthermore, it is possible that employees may have opted
for specific investments, in addition to investments in hous-
ing, social relations, and the employment of other members
of the family (Hansmann, 1988: 292). The restrictions on the
free transfer of the owner’s status (there are no “exit options”)
and the noncentralization of control rights make it difficult
to arrive at a consensus when it comes to decision making. As
a result, there is an obstacle to the existence of an organized
market of control rights able to coordinate managers’ perfor-
mance or to undertake certain monitoring activities like that
of takeover bids. On the other hand, it is difficult to make
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long-term employment contracts that are entirely void of risks
(Hansmann, 1988: 294), and exercising the “exit options”
remains restricted due to the nonexistence of a membership
market (Dow, 2001).
When it is not possible to protect interests through the
“exit options” or through contractual safeguards, the corpo-
rate governance will have to design incentive mechanisms or
assign “voice” to the groups involved (the “shared control”).
Therefore, we define the problem of corporate governance of
a cooperative in the following terms:
Definition: The corporate governance of a cooperative con-
sists of designing mechanisms and setting up institutions
that encourage workers to define a goal that maximizes work-
ers’ wealth or welfare (first level of governance) and, further-
more, induces managers to internalize such goals (second level
of governance).
In this definition, we would like to call attention to the
subtle difference in the problem of corporate governance be-
tween a cooperative and a capital-controlled firm. In fact, the
core problem can be traced to the agency problem that exists
between shareholders and managers. In this context, the capi-
talist corporate governance needs to suggest mechanisms or
institutions in order to settle an agency problem and to in-
duce managers to internalize the objectives of shareholders.
That is, the value of the firm or the welfare of shareholders is
the goal. Therefore, in a capital-controlled firm, the problem
of corporate governance is centered at the second level, for
there is unanimity among shareholders about what should be
the goal of the company.
In the cooperative, the solution to this dual problem of
corporate governance is obtained by guaranteeing that the
interests of all the workers are met. One way by which the
welfare of all of them can be incorporated into the decision-
making process of the firm would consist in moving from an
objective function with a single argument (e.g., to maximize
surplus per worker) toward a multidimensional-objective func-
tion that integrates the welfare of the different groups of work-
ers (Tirole, 2001). Now, the question becomes how to
implement such an objective function. In other words, what
corporate governance mechanisms would induce the manag-
ers to internalize this multidimensional mission?
Maximizing collective wealth and welfare in cooperatives
will come as a result of the following elements: (1) the effec-
tiveness of internal corporate governance mechanisms, such
as incentive contracts, corporate governing bodies, monitor-
ing structures or corporate culture (mutual monitoring, pres-
sure groups, solidarity, philanthropic groups, etc.); or
(2) external corporate governance mechanisms, such as com-
petition in the product and input markets (basically, the mana-
gerial input), as well as the legal framework. We want to
emphasize that due to the legal configuration of the coopera-
tive firm, the market for corporate control is a governance
mechanism not available for disciplining management.
A common practice in the capital-controlled firms geared
toward streamlining the objectives of shareholders and the
decisions of managers is to link their compensation to the
growth of profits. To implement this measure in the coopera-
tives implies that managers’ compensation will be linked to
some global welfare measures. However, at the time of draw-
ing up these incentive contracts, one is faced with the diffi-
culty of incorporating adequate indicators of such welfare.
This situation contrasts with the ease with which welfare in-
dicators, such as book profits or share price trend of share-
holders, are invoked in a capital-controlled firm. Consequently,
if the welfare of a group of workers is easier to measure than
other group’s welfare, managers will focus their attention on
the maximization of this objective to the detriment of other
objectives (Holmström & Milgrom, 1991). This implies that
when the objective function of the firm is not well defined
due to measurement problems, it is recommendable that
managers’ compensation be fixed (that is, should not be linked
to welfare indicators). Ambiguity in the collective welfare
indicators also undermines the effectiveness of implicit in-
centive systems such as promotion, for the market does not
know which indicator must be considered or which objec-
tive is pursued when it comes to appraising the manager’s
performance.
In spite of these theoretical predictions, the empirical evi-
dence points out examples of cooperatives that have provided
viable solutions to all the aforementioned problems.
Corporate Governance of the
Mondragón Cooperatives
The case of the MCC constitutes one of the most impressive
and successful examples of industrial cooperatives. This raises
a theoretical and empirical question of interest as to why the
MCC constituent cooperatives are so successful. The explana-
tion provided in this section, which is complementary to oth-
ers previously referred to in Whyte (1995; 1999) and Whyte
and Whyte (1991), states that the success of the MCC is based
on the mechanisms of corporate governance, developed over
more than 40 years. In this paper, we take into account these
points when studying the system of incentives and the corpo-
rate governance mechanisms that are currently operational in
Mondragón. The internal corporate governance mechanisms
of an individual cooperative are characterized by integrating,
in addition to the interests of its own workers, the interests of
other workers who belong to the constituent cooperatives.
The result is a complex structure of residual rights and corpo-
rate control rights that contribute to lowering the two gover-
nance conflicts, as previously pointed out. Thus, we take into
account the conflict of interests among workers when it comes
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to defining the best mission (first level of governance), and
the conflict between management and workers when it comes
to guaranteeing that such mission is fulfilled (second level of
governance).
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The Mondragón cooperative experience started in 1956 when
the first cooperative was created under the name Ulgor (cur-
rently known as Fagor). The founders of this cooperative gave
authority to the workers to choose their governing bodies
(Whyte, 1999). This initiative came to be the nucleus onto
which other cooperatives of diverse nature were aggregated.
On the whole, they were suppliers of Ulgor and drew inspira-
tion from its organizational features.
In 1959, the creation of Caja Laboral Popular (henceforth,
CL) marked an important milestone in the existence of the
group. This financial cooperative was established to take care
of the financial and consultancy needs of the cooperatives and
its members. CL played a fundamental role in the consolida-
tion and expansion of the Mondragón cooperative movement,
soon becoming the main link and the backbone of all the
cooperatives that were created during the 1960s and 1970s.
In fact, the group distinguished itself by linking these coop-
eratives to CL within the framework of an exclusive relation-
ship in which the cooperatives could only transact with CL,
and where the CL provided the cooperatives with all the fi-
nancial and consultancy services. However, this close bank–
firm relationship revealed a problem of concentration of risks.
The agreements signed with CL seriously restricted the bank’s
ability to discipline these cooperatives, mainly due to the dif-
ficulty encountered by the institution when dissolving or liq-
uidating cooperatives under financial distress, which were
either founders of the bank or firms created and nurtured by
CL (García-Cestona, 1996).
Throughout the 1980s, the organization of the group un-
derwent a process of changes that culminated in a new ar-
rangement—the Mondragón Cooperative Group. The main
goal was to carry out a better coordination of these coopera-
tives so as to benefit from the presence of synergies, the imple-
mentation of new mechanisms of governance that facilitated
control tasks by the group and further independence for the
cooperative bank. This process culminated in the foundation,
in 1991, of the MCC.
The creation of the MCC entailed a considerable transfor-
mation of both CL and the group, so as to satisfy the need for
converting CL, gradually, into a commercial bank that trans-
acts with third parties outside the group, as explained in
Ormaetxea (1997). In this way, the risk associated with the
close relationship between CL and the Mondragón coopera-
tives, and caused by the bank’s limited ability to discipline an
individual cooperative, was severely reduced.5 The ultimate
outcome of this process was the transfer of the promotion and
monitoring activities, formerly carried out by CL, to the MCC.
But the creation of the MCC did not only entail a new
configuration of the group. Just as Ormaetxea (1997) indi-
cates, by the end of the 1980s, the cooperative group had no
capacity to intervene in the corporate policy of the individual
cooperatives. Furthermore, many top managers of the group
were aware of the possibility of taking advantage of the pres-
ence of important synergies, especially among those coopera-
tives belonging to the same sector of activity.
As a result of the creation of the MCC, the transforma-
tions in the organizational structure of the group brought
about the appearance of divisions and sectorial subgroups
where the constituent cooperatives were allocated based on
their products and market similarities. Consequently, the in-
tervention capacity of the MCC in the business units was
increased. In Figure 2, the control architecture of the MCC is
shown. Nevertheless, these cooperatives continued to be au-
tonomous bodies, and, as such, they were free to accept or
reject the agreements signed with the MCC. In this sense,
the shifting of control rights to the MCC from the coopera-
tives was based on the idea that the latter would realize the
fact that this would imply a greater ability to generate wealth
and a better distribution of the surplus. In order to encour-
age the acceptance of the new organization, the MCC offered
a series of complementary resources in terms of financial, tech-
nological, and managerial support, along with training fa-
cilities to the joining cooperatives.
For the purpose of studying corporate governance mecha-
nisms of cooperatives, evidence will be provided about how
the constitution of the MCC brought about the integration of
institutions that helped in the resolution of the dual problem
referred to in the previous sections. To be precise, the MCC
incorporated institutions that (1) prompted cooperative mem-
bers to define a mission that maximizes the collective wealth
and (2) prompted managers to internalize such a mission.
Institutions for Defining a Mission That
Maximizes Collective Wealth
In the theoretical approach, it has been defined that one of
the problems of cooperative governance (first level of gover-
nance) consists of setting up mechanisms and institutions
that help workers to define a mission that maximizes collec-
tive wealth. On the other hand, in the presentation of this
case, it has been explained that prior to the constitution of
the MCC, there was hardly the possibility for the group to
intervene in the corporate policy of a single cooperative. For
this reason, the top managers of different cooperatives were
aware of the lost synergies and the missing opportunities for
a better coordination. This notwithstanding, the constitu-
tion of the MCC meant the appearance of a series of mecha-
7 
nisms that enhanced the creation of collective wealth. This
was achieved by (1) coordinating the activities of the indi-
vidual cooperatives, (2) implementing collective policies
through a system of shared control, and (3) establishing the
necessary incentives in order to obtain the involvement of
the constituent cooperatives.
Coordinating the activities of the constituent coopera-
tives. Figure 2 shows the control architecture and the coordi-
nation mechanisms of the MCC. The sectorial subgroups,
divisions, and the MCC general council are entrusted with
drawing up a common strategic policy and ensuring its ful-
fillment through the nomination of managers who must pur-
FIGURE 2
Control Mechanism in the Mondragón Cooperative Corporation
Source: Authors’ elaboration with the synopsis of valid norms passed by the MCC congress (MCC, 1995).
Notes: 1. In proportion of the number of members. 2. One and three representatives for cooperative according to the number of members. 3. A maximum
of 30 percent of representatives per division. 4. With voice, but without voice. 5. In CL and Lagun-Aro (they form their own sectorial subgroup), the
sectorial group council is constituted  by their own governing council.
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sue the implementation of such strategy. The business units,
which are the constituent cooperatives, inform the managers
(i.e., chief executives) of the sectorial subgroup about their
objectives and activities. The latter are entrusted with codi-
fying, selecting, and transmitting the most important infor-
mation to the vice president in charge of that sectorial
subgroup. In addition, the vice president centralizes the in-
formation proceeding from other sectorial subgroups account-
able to him or her. He or she, in turn, transmits the most
important information to the president of the general coun-
cil, which is the final authority entrusted with drawing up
the plan based on all the information culled from the general
policies of the MCC as a whole.
Once these general policies are formulated, this informa-
tion will be transmitted to all the divisions and sectorial sub-
groups. From that point, the chief executive of each sectorial
subgroup will be responsible for converting the objectives or
plans gathered from the division into concrete and central-
ized plans for the constituent cooperatives. He or she will also
be expected to monitor the fulfillment of these plans. There-
fore, the data for drawing up the global strategy of the MCC
comes from each of the constituent cooperatives.
Implementation of the general policies through shared
control. The second conclusion drawn from the analysis of
the MCC monitoring and control systems portrayed in Fig-
ure 2 is that the constituent cooperatives have transferred some
decision rights to the managers of sectorial subgroups, divi-
sions, and the MCC general council.
In principle, the individual cooperatives are free to pursue
their own interests, but on joining the MCC, they are, in fact,
shifting control rights to the sectorial subgroup because the
nomination of the cooperative manager and his or her follow-
up must be done now by the chief executive of the subgroup.
Moreover, prior to his or her nomination by the sectorial group
council, the chief executive has been proposed by the MCC
vice president in charge of the division, who has been nomi-
nated by the standing committee of the MCC congress. There-
fore, this sequence of nominations for the positions of managers
by the representatives of the MCC, division, and sectorial sub-
group entails an intervention in the affairs of the constituent
cooperatives through the election of the person responsible (that
is, the manager) for the policy implementation. In addition,
the decisions of the cooperative must be in accordance with the
corporate strategies, at the corporate and at the division and
subgroup levels. Furthermore, in the event of not adhering to
the broad guidelines stipulated in the corporate strategic plans,
there are mechanisms for sanctioning the cooperatives, includ-
ing dismissal from the MCC as a last resort.
Incentives for joining the MCC. As has been previously
posed, the participation of the cooperatives in the MCC project
is not mandatory and it must be voted and approved by the
cooperative members. Therefore, the fact that workers accept
to delegate control rights must be explained in terms of achiev-
ing a higher added value when joining the MCC. In fact, when
interviewed, the managers of cooperatives state that the MCC
provides them with a brand image and greater accessibility to
a series of corporate institutions such as collateral entities (Caja
Laboral), social welfare (Lagun-Aro), research centers (Ikerlan,
Ideko, or MTC), training centers (Otalora, for training man-
agers), and an array of corporate support services (such as fi-
nancial management, technical and quality development,
internationalization expertise, etc.).
Another key element for obtaining the involvement of
the individual cooperatives and, especially, for reinforcing
the achievement of the common objectives defined in the
strategic planning is the fund named “Fondo Central de
Intercooperación” (Central Fund of Intercooperation). This
fund is managed by the MCC board of directors, and its
objective is to reward those who put into practice the cor-
porate policies and strategies suggested by the MCC. This
is achieved by reinforcing the financial capacity of the con-
stituent cooperatives.
However, when the generation of collective wealth is not
enough to guarantee the participation of workers in organiz-
ing the project, it is necessary to convince workers that the
rules for sharing the generated wealth will benefit them, or, at
least, that they will not be worse off. In this context, it is
worth highlighting the rules on surplus sharing (see Figure
3). In addition, the policy of fixing “advance payments for
labor” on the basis of market criteria has the objective of en-
couraging workers to be more diligent.6 Finally, through the
“normativa sobre el tratamiento del capital social y distribución
de los resultados” (norms on the use of equity and rules of
profit sharing), the necessary incentives are provided so as to
promote capital accumulation. In particular, it is achieved
through the interest rates paid to capital and the regulations
on the distribution of surplus sharing. It is also important to
encourage cooperation among these cooperatives through the
“reconversión de resultados” (reconversion of results), which is
a key element for strengthening the links between the con-
stituent cooperatives. With the “reconversion,” the income of
an individual cooperative no longer depends exclusively on its
own operations. Rather, the results increase or decrease in re-
lation to the results of the other cooperative members in the
same sectorial subgroup, same division, and, in some cases,
the same regional subgroup. In particular, each cooperative
contributes a percentage of its results to a pool formed by all
the MCC; later on these funds are distributed among the co-
operatives depending on size and workforce. On the other hand,
the implementation of a measure such as this is not easy and it
has a cost, for it can encourage individual cooperatives to ex-
hibit opportunistic behavior. If the results of a cooperative are
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determined as a proportion of the total results of the sectorial
subgroup, division, or regional subgroup, then the results of
the group become a public good subject to moral hazard con-
siderations.
Institutions for Inducing Managers to
Internalize the Mission
Once the mission of maximizing collective wealth is defined
by all members of the cooperative (first level of governance),
the next problem consists of inducing the manager to inter-
nalize this mission (second level of governance). The MCC
experience provides us with a system of incentives and super-
vision mechanisms that make it possible to find a solution to
this second problem.
Managers’ incentives to achieve the cooperative mission.
The compensation practices have changed substantially in
recent years, especially if we focus on the compensation of
MCC top managers. In the past, there was a compensation
limit that reduced the differences among cooperative mem-
bers: the highest compensation could not exceed 4.5 times
the lowest one (this ratio was 1:3 at the creation of the first
cooperative). Now, it has been replaced by a manager’s com-
pensation, which is about 70 percent of the market compen-
sation. This economic change has also been accompanied by
an improvement in the social status of managers, and some
former top managers have taken up important positions in
institutions of the Basque government later in their lives. On
the other hand, these important managerial tasks are carried
out, almost exclusively, by people who have been working in
the cooperatives for many years. Internal promotion and ca-
reer concerns are important elements here. The appointment
of managerial positions is the responsibility of the top man-
agers of the MCC, such as the vice presidents. Consequently,
it can be said that the performance of managers is enhanced,
first, by the explicit incentive of a compensation that is stipu-
lated in the policy of the MCC. According to this, the wages
for functions of responsibility are linked with the productiv-
ity of the managerial input. Second, performance is also en-
hanced by the implicit incentive of getting promoted inside
the MCC with the possibility of occupying jobs of greater
responsibility within the organization (career concerns). This
possibility can occasionally serve as a gateway to a more fa-
vorable labor market and, sometimes, as a gateway to the po-
litical arena.
Monitoring mechanisms to achieve the cooperative mis-
sion. The normal running of the cooperative is the responsi-
bility of the manager, who is accountable to both the vigilance
committee, which represents the interests of all workers, and
to the chief executive of the sectorial subgroup, who repre-
FIGURE 3
Distribution of Surplus of an Individual Cooperative
Source: Synopsis of valid norms of the MCC congress (MCC, 1995).
Note: Gross surplus is the income before taxes and after paying the interests on capital.
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sents the interests of the MCC. Therefore, the manager of the
cooperative is monitored in two ways—by the members of
this cooperative (internal monitoring) and by the MCC (ex-
ternal monitoring).
With regard to internal monitoring, the vigilance com-
mittee is the body entrusted with the follow-up of decisions
and results of the manager. Later, the committee informs the
general assembly of its performance. Then, it is the responsi-
bility of the governing council to replace the members of the
board of directors or even the manager if necessary.
With regard to external monitoring, the strategic plan of
the sectorial subgroup must be reflected, at the cooperative
level, in the strategic plan of the individual cooperative, which
is carried out through annual management plans. In this way,
the annual management plan constitutes a key tool for the
MCC at the time of monitoring the performance of the coop-
erative, for it incorporates both quantitative and qualitative
indicators that are subject to a follow-up. When the actual
results fall short of the estimated figures, the board of direc-
tors of the sectorial subgroup can recommend to the govern-
ing council the replacement of the manager.
IMPLICATIONS AND NEW PERSPECTIVES
IN THE STUDY OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
In this study, the literature on cooperatives is complemented
and extended by using the conceptual framework of corpo-
rate governance. In our opinion, the problem of governance
of this type of organization is twofold. The first issue consists
in guaranteeing that a mission that maximizes efficiency is
defined, whereas the second issue is how to implement this
mission in a successful manner. The solution to the dual prob-
lem of governance is comparatively more complex in a coop-
erative firm than in a typical capitalist firm. With regard to
the definition of the mission, a greater multiplicity of work-
ers’ interests increases the costs of collective decision making.
And, concerning how the mission can be achieved, the multi-
plicity of owners can lead to opportunistic behavior on the
side of the management, and, as a result, the agency problem
will be more severe. Through the case of Mondragón, we have
tried to illustrate how governance mechanisms perform in an
organization that is often presented as the paradigm of suc-
cess of the cooperative firm. The case is of greater importance
when we consider that these cooperatives undertake the greater
share of their activities in the industrial sector, in which, ac-
cording to the literature, the cooperative formula would have
less competitive advantages.
The theory sustained in this paper postulates that the suc-
cess of the MCC can be explained, to a great extent, by the
success of its system of corporate governance, which has con-
tinued to adjust itself throughout the years, until reaching its
present features. The cooperatives that form the group have a
broad mission that integrates the interests of different coop-
erative workers who are also stakeholders of the MCC group.
Workers have been able to express their views and interests in
the process of drawing up the MCC’s strategic policy in which
all the cooperatives participated. Afterward, this general policy
is formulated into strategic plans, first, for the divisions; then,
for the sectorial subgroups; and, finally, for the joining coop-
eratives. But, how have they achieved the welfare maximiza-
tion of the different stakeholders involved? To answer this
question is, from our perspective, tantamount to solving the
dual problem previously mentioned: (1) how can we succeed
in defining a mission that maximizes collective welfare? and
(2) how can we induce managers to pursue this mission?
The solution to the first problem was achieved by a volun-
tary shift of decision rights from the cooperatives to the MCC.
Through this delegation of powers, the MCC executive com-
mission (board of directors) was free to draw up a common
strategic policy for the entire group. This is the only way to
guarantee the fulfillment of the objectives of all the workers
and to coordinate, at the same time, the activities of the coop-
eratives that belong to the group. In order to adapt the man-
agement of each cooperative to this framework, the MCC relied
on its authority and on its maneuvering ability to name and
replace managers, who represent the interests of the entire
MCC group inside a given cooperative. Obviously, the del-
egation of decision rights made by the workers must be ac-
companied by some compensation in terms of higher results
for them. In this regard, the regulation on surplus sharing
constitutes a powerful incentive mechanism (and a form of
risk sharing), which facilitates the workers’ participation in
the MCC project. Internal regulations also help in the resolu-
tion of conflicts of interests that emerge when it comes to
defining the mission (i.e., levels of labor and investments and
an adequate capitalization of the cooperative). We also ob-
serve that the problem of collective decision making has been
partly solved through the delegation of power within the co-
operative, and partly by the external pressure coming from
the strategic plans.
The incentive mechanisms and the group monitoring have
had a positive effect on the resolution of the second governance
problem: the internalization by managers of the objectives in-
cluded in the mission. With regard to shared control, the
manager’s performance was evaluated, taking into account
(1) the achievement of the goals of the entire MCC, particu-
larly the interests of workers of other cooperatives, and (2) its
ability to satisfy the goals of the cooperative members. Con-
cerning the first dimension, the manager is accountable to the
chief executive of the sectorial subgroup. Whereas, in the sec-
ond dimension, cooperative members can assess the fulfillment
of their own objectives through the resource committee, the
social council, and, ultimately, the general assembly. Shared
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control has been accompanied by a system of incentives that
have induced managers of individual cooperatives to internal-
ize the mission defined by (the managers of) the group. In this
sense, we have identified a substantial change in the compen-
sation practices, especially since the creation of the MCC as a
corporation. The result has been an improvement in both the
social status of managers and in their economic compensation.
The possibility of getting along in the MCC (internal promo-
tion) and, subsequently, opting for higher compensations, which
are about 70 percent of the market compensation for similar
positions, has been instrumental in getting the managers in-
volved. Furthermore, the possibilities of promotion are not lim-
ited to the MCC, and some former top managers have become
top civil servants in institutions of the Basque government.
An alternative explanation for the MCC success, which
complements ours, is provided from the perspective of exter-
nal governance mechanisms: the competitiveness in the prod-
uct markets and the legal regulation constitute a powerful
governance mechanism, although they have not been studied
in this paper. An interesting feature of this case study is that,
unlike other cooperatives (as is often the case in professional
services) outside the group, Mondragón cooperatives are
present in sectors different from those in which, in principle,
this type of enterprise enjoys certain advantages. In fact, many
of the cooperatives that form the MCC are industrial in na-
ture and participate in competitive markets where the de-
mand of efficiency is high. Nevertheless, the pressure from the
product market or the regulation itself does not explain why
these organizations include in their mission objectives or goals
that involve some sacrifice in terms of economic efficiency.
The success of the MCC governance mechanisms is also
based on the group’s ability to keep growing. On one hand,
the participation of the cooperatives in the project is facili-
tated by the resources and information they obtain from the
group. On the other hand, a well-functioning incentive sys-
tem for managers is closely related to the existence of growth.
Both promotion opportunities and the variable compensa-
tion component depend on the presence of favorable results
of the whole group. This raises doubts about the performance
of control mechanisms in the event of widespread negative
results.
Implications for the Research on
Cooperative Governance
If worker ownership causes policy costs due to the collective
election, efficiency can be improved upon by incorporating a
new stakeholder into the monitoring mechanism, one with
interests that are more in tune with the maximization of eco-
nomic efficiency. In Mondragón, the MCC plays this role, and
this is carried out with the help of the cooperative manager,
who is entrusted with pursuing the workers’ objectives and
maximizing their utility functions. Concurrently, he or she is
responsible for collective wealth maximization. It is obvious
that maximizing wealth will be to the greater benefit of all
workers. But, without the MCC pressure on the cooperative
decisions, workers will suffer more from moral hazard when
adopting decisions. The delegation of some decision rights
by cooperative workers to other stakeholders (in our case, the
MCC) must be accompanied by the proper incentives in order
to enhance organizational transformation. Generating more
wealth is not enough; it must be shared in a way that allows
initial owners not to be worse off. Through this delegation of
certain rights to other groups—for example, to financial sup-
pliers—the cooperatives could start to overcome their tradi-
tional financial problems.
In short, a possible solution to the limits of industrial co-
operatives would be to move toward a hybrid model of gover-
nance, in which workers joined efforts with another stakeholder
whose interests are more in tune with the maximization of
economic efficiency. One stakeholder that could play such a
role would be a financial supplier.
Obviously, this would affect the autonomy of labor, even
though incorporating this stakeholder into the monitoring
process could be undertaken in a way similar to the German
case. In Germany, there are two types of limited liability com-
panies, Gesellschaft mit beschräukten Haftung (GMBH), for un-
listed companies, and Akitiengesellschaft (AG), for listed
companies. One special feature is that both corporate bodies
face the legal obligation of creating a dual-level board. The
first level is the supervisory board, or aufsichstrat, which is
entrusted with monitoring the managers, and the second is
the management board, or vorstand, which is responsible for
the daily management of the firm.
It is important to highlight that workers’ representatives
and those members elected by shareholders, and who are not
employees of the firm, have equal shares in the supervisory
board. These counselors, elected by the shareholders, are
equivalent to the external consultants of firms in the United
States. In general, they come from other commercial and fi-
nancial firms that have a long-term and significant relation-
ship with the firm. For the purposes of our work, it is
important to stress that with this special configuration of the
supervisory board, the fulfillment of the interests of other
groups are then protected and monitored.
Likewise, a dual-level structure could be employed in the
case of producer cooperatives. The management board would
still be the daily managerial body, with the manager at the
helm of affairs. However, in the governing council or the vigi-
lance committee, there would be room for other stakeholders
representing the interests of other input suppliers, such as
the financial suppliers.
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Implications for the Research on
Corporate Governance
We believe that focusing the analysis on the cooperative in-
stead of the traditional capitalist firm has some advantages.
Zingales (2000) argues that the recent changes in the nature
of modern corporations entailed an increase in the importance
of specific investments of the different stakeholders that par-
ticipate in the corporation. In fact, human capital in some of
these firms has been converted into a key asset. This phenom-
enon also occurs in the case of investments by other stake-
holders, such as in the case of suppliers. The firm has a wider
scope, and the governance approach now focuses on conflict
prevention among stakeholders, so as to prevent such prob-
lems from bringing the firm to a standstill or, worse, from
jeopardizing its existence. For this reason, the corporate gov-
ernance problem of firms that integrate different stakeholders
becomes closer to the governance concerns in the cooperatives
than to the traditional approach in capitalist companies.
Taking into consideration what has been previously ex-
plained and focusing now on the useful conclusions from the
governance of firms, we observe that (1) the combination of
incentives and monitoring mechanisms in Mondragón have
been vital in defining a mission that maximizes collective
wealth, and (2) it accounts for the impetus toward achieving
this mission. This conclusion, drawn from the case study in
which multiple tasks were undertaken, can be compared with
the theoretical conclusions from other analyses of efficiency
in contexts with multiple goals and with different stakehold-
ers that participated in the monitoring process (Holmström,
1999; Rajan & Zingales, 1998). Although the theory (Hart,
1995) indicates that the concentration of residual rights on
one stakeholder enhances the collective efficiency (in com-
parison to shared ownership and control), some scenarios have
been identified in which shared control entails more efficiency.
This is particularly observed at a place of work where various
tasks are undertaken and the results that are obtained concern
different stakeholders.
Shared control contributes to reducing the intensity of in-
centives on the task of which the result is preferred by the one
who makes decisions, in comparison with the intensity of in-
centives that would come out if one person gets all of the
control. By reducing the intensity of these incentives, a gen-
eral system of better-balanced (between the various tasks and
the results) compensations is achieved with a positive impact
on efficiency.
This result can be compared with the predictions of Tirole
(2001), which indicated that concentrating control in the
hands of just one person is preferable to shared control. His
argument is based on the fact that allocating control in the
hands of shareholders can bring about biased choices (in par-
ticular, maximizing share prices without taking into account
the interest of workers, suppliers, clients, or the community),
but this is, nevertheless, preferred to the costs associated with
shared control and a multiplicity of objectives.
We believe that this argumentation does not consider the
possibility of integrating shared control and a multiplicity of
objectives. Under these circumstances, the manager’s prefer-
ence to economic results would be reduced and, at the same
time, other objectives in the mission of the firm, which rep-
resent the interests of other stakeholders, would be equally
taken into consideration. Likewise, the theory of property
rights and that of incomplete contracts, along with their pos-
sible integration in the design of incentives when there are
multiple tasks, open new possibilities for implementing shared
control mechanisms in organizations in which stakeholders
are involved.
Therefore, we present evidence contrary to Tirole’s inter-
pretation. First, it is not strictly true that in the absence of
adequate indicators of the stakeholders’ welfare, managers will
always focus their attention on the maximization of the eco-
nomic results, due to the fact that they are more readily mea-
surable. Second, even if we entertain the possibility that there
are policy costs to be incurred from shared control, we do not
have enough evidence to show that those costs are higher than
the agency costs or the costs of other governance-related prob-
lems present in a shareholder-oriented organization.
For that reason, we cannot conclude that if the MCC pur-
sues a stakeholder-oriented approach in its mission, this will
unmistakably weaken its competitive stand. Nevertheless, we
have observed that it certainly demands much more elabo-
rated governance solutions.
NOTES
1. The law foresees this problem and therefore regulates the
formation of governing bodies, as is the case of the regulation
concerning the creation of governing councils.
2. If workers are compensated with part of the total product
according to workers’ contributions to the cooperative (in terms
of labor or specific investments), this total outcome will become
a public good subject to the problem of free rider. Therefore, if a
worker chooses some efficient contributions, he or she will be
subject to an expropriation of wealth, because the marginal cost
of the contribution will be higher than the marginal profit that
he or she will receive in exchange (considering that other work-
ers, pursuing solely their own interests, opt for the second-best
solution).
3. The nonavailability of the “exit option” is a convincing hy-
pothesis because the cooperatives participate in less competitive
markets (Hansmann, 1999). In any case, if the “exit options”
were to exist (i.e., the specific investment in human capital were
not substantial), workers with high productivity would find bet-
ter-paid jobs outside the cooperative, in accordance with their
marginal productivity. Therefore, only the least productive work-
ers would remain in the cooperative (Kremer, 1997).
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4. The more specialized the human capital is, or the greater
the requirements of capital finance are in order to acquire physi-
cal assets, the more acute the problem of lack of risk diversifica-
tion becomes.
5. Various inspections by the Bank of Spain pointed out such
risk. This concern led to the recommendation that the bank be
opened to third parties outside the group.
6. Integrated into salaries, it consists of advance payments,
throughout the year, of the generated surplus in the fiscal year.
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